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While most Central European countries, realising the inflationary potential of money 
creation, had by the mid-1990s switched to market instruments based monetary 
policy, Belarus continued to use money emission, so gaining seigniorage and inflation 
tax. The productivity of the inflation tax can be analysed by comparing the revenue 
actually raised from inflation tax with the revenue that could be raised if the quantity 
of money had risen at a constant rate. The present paper, based on Cagan’s (1956) 
seminal work ‘Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation’, analyses the effect of inflation 
on seigniorage revenue in Belarus and draws conclusions about the effectiveness of 
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Money creation remained the main source for financing budget deficits in all 
transition economies during the early stages of transformation. Consequently, the 
economic gains from money creation came in the form of seigniorage and inflation 
tax.  Despite the de jure independence of the central banks created in the transition 
economies, de facto they remained under the control of governments during the early 
stage of transition. This permitted them to print money to finance government 
expenditures with seigniorage.  
Emission policy has remained the dominant monetary instrument in some 
transition economies like Belarus and Turkmenistan over the years of transition.   
However, many other transition economies, including the majority of Central 
European countries, realising the inflationary nature of money creation, have switched 
to using more market instruments to carry out monetary policy. Consequently, by 
reducing money emission, these countries have limited the gains form seigniorage and 
the inflation tax.  
Governments are often tempted to resort to inflationary financing due to the 
public finance motive, implying that the revenue losses from direct taxes can be offset 
by introducing implicit forms of taxation in the form of inflation tax (IT). However, 
some empirical studies show that inflationary financing does not fully explain cases of 
chronic high-inflation. In transition economies, at least at the early stages of 
transformation or in some countries even at present, the distinction between public 
and private is blurred, which implies that along with a budget deficit it is common to 
have a quasi-budget deficit. This explains the phenomenon of low budget deficit in 
some transition economies when one would expect it to be much higher. In the 
countries with a high share of the state ownership, with slow pace of reforms and a 
high degree of state interference in economic activity (e.g. Belarus, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan) quasi-budget activities in the form of directed and preferential credits 
to state-owned enterprises become a very common practice.  
Since inflation tax is a tax, there exists a maximum point at which it is 
optimised under a certain rate of money growth that can be called the revenue-
maximising rate.    3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 defines the revenue-maximising 
rate of money growth. The productivity of the tax is then analysed by comparing the 
revenue actually raised with the revenue that could have been raised if the quantity of 
money had risen at a constant rate. Section 2 specifies the model of demand for 
money that is used to estimate the maximum revenue the government can gain from 
money emission under steady-state conditions. Section 3 reports the results. A unique 
data approach is used. We show that the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
unit root is not able to capture the impact of structural breaks in the data. Hitherto 
research on money demand in Belarus does not account for structural breaks. That 
leads to the incorrect treatment of the data - regarding them as I(1) rather than I(0).  
Zivot and Andrews’ methodology (1992), which allows searching for endogenous 
breaks in series, is used to test for unit root. A Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) is 
employed to estimate final results. The main findings follow in the conclusion.  
   
1. Conceptual Framework of Defining the Optimal Seigniorage 
 


























M ,                                          (1)  
where M – nominal monetary base (M 0) and P- price level, measured as the 
consumer price index. 
  The inflation tax is literally a tax on nominal assets. Since most of government 
debt takes the form of non-indexed nominal assets, the value of that debt is eroded 
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  where the tax rate is the inflation rate.
2 
Seigniorage can be expressed as the sum of the inflation tax on the monetary 
base and the increase in the real stock of monetary base (see for example Cagan 1956 
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When real money balances are constant over time, that is M/P=M-1/P-1, 
seigniorage and inflation tax are equal.  
Both seigniorage and inflation tax are regarded as forms of implicit 
discriminatory taxation of the economy, and particularly of the financial system. In 
the literature on financial development seigniorage and inflation tax appear to 
complement financial repression (FR)
3, regarded as another form of implicit taxation. 
The complementarities between them lie in the following: 1) interest savings on 
government liabilities an be obtained through inflation policy that given nominal 
interest rate ceilings implies very low real interest rates; 2) imposition of reserve 
requirements, one of the instrument of FR, increases directly the IT base; 3) a limited 
choice of financial instruments and low or negative real interest rates increase money 
demand, in this way augmenting the IT base (Giovanni and De Melo 1993, p. 955).  
(2) embodies the classical approach to IT. However, in some empirical studies, 
other monetary aggregates are used as the IT tax base. For example, should distortions 
in real interest rates (under condition of nominal interest-ceilings) due to inflation be 
included as part of IT or as FR. Giovannini and de Melo (1993) argue that it is 
incorrect to relate them to IT because the inflation tax base is high-powered money, 
while financial repression affects the portfolio of non-monetary assets held by 
domestic residents.  
                                                 
2 Here it should be borne in mind that the inflation tax base is high-powered money (M 0). For a 
discussion of this issue see below. 
3 This term was first introduced by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) who defined financial 
repression as a set of ‘ill-conceived’ policies and controls, primarily in the forms of interest rates 
ceilings, requirements for banks to hold government bonds and/or finance government budget deficits, 
directed credit schemes to support ‘selective’ industries, high reserve requirements, administratively 
regulated foreign exchange rates, imposed by governments on financial sector, that restrain financial 
intermediaries’ activities.   5
Assuming that the economy is initially in a steady state, seigniorage can be 
represented graphically as a Laffer curve (figure 1) with respect to the rate of money 
growth. It initially rises and then falls with higher money growth. There is a 
maximum point at which seigniorage is optimised under a certain rate of money 
growth that can be called the revenue-maximising rate of money growth. Essentially 
there is a trade-off between a higher rate of money growth increasing seigniorage and 
the associated inflation decreasing it by lowering demand for money. When 
government needs can be financed with seigniorage lower then the maximum rate, 
there exists a dual steady state equilibrium implying that the same amount of 
seigniorage can be obtained at low and high inflation steady state points.  
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Figure 1: The Seigniorage (S) Laffer curve
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There exists a body of work on the issue of seigniorage and its optimal value. Most 
empirical studies are based on Cagan’s (1956) paper. Given that wealth in real terms 
and real income are relatively stable under hyperinflation, Cagan (1956) assumes that 
in a period of high inflation, changes in demand for real balances largely result from 
the extreme fluctuation in prices. That is, money demand is a function of the expected 
rate of inflation rather than of the nominal interest rate.
5 The optimal seigniorage is 
calculated by applying the steady-state conditions to the revenue-maximising rate of 
money growth. Under steady-state conditions, when the quantity of money rises at a 
constant rate, expected inflation is assumed to be equal to actual inflation, and the 
quantity of real balances does not change over time. This implies the rate of money 
                                                 
4 The figure is adapted from Romer (1996, p.422). 
5 For more details see Cagan (1956, pp.25-117).   6
growth equals inflation. To consider the relation between inflation and seigniorage 
under steady-state conditions recall the money demand function under high inflation 




= γ α − − E ,                           (4) 
 where  M is an end-of-month index of the quantity of money in circulation, and 
P is an end-of-month index of the price level. α  is a positive constant denoting the 
semielasticity in the demand for money with respect to the rate of inflation ;γ  is a 
constant; E stands for the expected rate of change in prices and is assumed to be a 
function of the actual rate of change, C, that is in turn equal to the difference between 
the logarithms of successive values of the index of prices. The expected rate of 
inflation is: 
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Converting equation (4) from logs and substituting into (2) gives:
6  
γ απ π
− − = e R  ,                             (6) 
where π  – inflation 
  The maximum seigniorage conditions are: 
0 ) 1 ( = − =
∂
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These conditions are satisfied for π <1/α . Here it is very important to note 
that this maximum revenue can be maintained indefinitely. No maximum revenue 
exists when the tax is first imposed; the higher the tax rate, the higher the revenue due 
to underestimation of inflation and consequently gradual adjustment in real cash 
balances. This is the case when the government can obtain seigniorage greater than 
the long term maximum value. After households start correctly estimating expected 
inflation, the adjustment to their real cash balances tends to be instantaneous. Higher 
                                                 
6 See Cagan (1956, pp.80).   7
money growth leads to higher inflation and correspondingly to a decrease in the 
demand for real money balances and a fall in the revenue from seigniorage. 
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where  












 is the desired level of real money 





































δ δ ,                    (10) 
 
That is the real money balances at time t is a weighted average of the desired 
real money balances at that time and the real money balances in the previous period, 
with the respective weights δ and (1- ) δ . 
Since  
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If the government needs (G) to be financed by seigniorage exceed the 
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−  (14) and substituting (12) into 
(14) gives us: 
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  Condition (13) means that the rate of inflation exceeds the rate of money 
growth.  
The above argument implies that when the adjustment in real cash balances is 
gradual, government can obtain seigniorage greater than the steady-state maximum 
value, but only at the expense of accelerating inflation.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
 
Estimating the optimal seigniorage under steady–state conditions requires the 
estimation of demand for real money balances. The simplest model links real balances 
to output and to interest rates, and around that basic idea models have proliferated.
8  
Because interests rates are not market determined and are subject to regulation 
by the monetary authorities in some transition economies, they are not a good proxy 
for the opportunity costs of holding money. This is especially typical of countries with 
high inflation rates and negative interest rates (e.g. Belarus). In such cases can be used 
to measure the opportunity cost for holding money. Moreover, use of inflationary 
expectations to represent the opportunity cost of holding precautionary cash balances 
is needed to explain the relationship between inflation and real cash balances within 
the adapted framework for estimating optimal seigniorage.  Recalling Cagan’s study 
                                                 
7 Romer’s (1996) calculations are also based on Cagan’s money demand function.   
8 For the systemic literature survey of money demand theories see Sriram (1999).   9
of hyperinflation, in a period of high inflation, changes in demand for real balances 
largely result from extreme fluctuations in prices. Finally, the expected rate of 
inflation as a proxy for opportunity costs has been used in many studies of money 
demand in the countries with high inflation (see for example, Choudhry 1995 and 
Yartseva 1999).  
  As far as the real income variable is concerned, Cagan (1956) does not include 
it in his model of real cash balances, arguing that it remained relatively stable during 
the period of hyperinflation. Moreover, Kiguel and Neumeyer (1995), while 
investigating the relationship between seigniorage and inflation in Argentina in the 
periods 1979-80, 1982-84, and 1986-1987, found that the coefficient on the 
transactions variable, represented by GDP, was not significantly different from zero. 
Other economists include income in the demand function, imposing a unitary income 
elasticity restriction. Some empirical studies show that this restriction does not hold 
(see for example Filosa 1995). In the present study I included real income as an 
explanatory variable, proxying it by monthly GDP. 
The problems of empirical modeling of the money demand function in 
transition economies include the phenomenon of currency substitution for foreign 
currency and for quasi-money. The latter can be ignored for the time being since in 
the present study nominal money balances are proxied by high-powered money. As 
far as the problem of dollarisation is concerned, this can be captured by including the 
expected rate of devaluation of the national currency as an opportunity cost of holding 
money. However, using both the expected rate of inflation and the expected rate of 
currency devaluation in our model can result in problems of multicollinearity.  
Thus, the present model of money demand will include real income, proxied 
by monthly GDP, and the expected rate inflation (see figure 2). The data are 
represented on a monthly basis ranging from May 1995 and December 2002. The 
sample is chosen to reflect the periods of high inflation in Belarus and on the basis of 
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Figure 2: Inflation series (DP), the natural log of real cash balances (LNM), the natural log 
of real GDP (LNY) and the natural logarithm of real GDP seasonally adjusted
9 
 
The monetary base (MB) is the sum of currency in circulation and reserve accounts of 
commercial banks at the National Bank. The nominal monetary base is deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to create the real money balances, and the inflation rate 
is the monthly rate of change of the CPI. The nominal GDP is deflated by the GDP 
deflator to create real GDP, which was seasonally adjusted using X12arima test 
performed in EViews Version 3.1.
10  
Data on the nominal monetary base was obtained from the National Bank of 
Belarus
11, while data on the monthly rate of inflation and monthly GDP were 




                                                 
9 National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003. 
10 The results of the test for seasonality in series showed that the log of real GDP (LNY) exhibited a 
seasonal pattern with the peaks in March and August-September that was closely linked with sowing 
and harvesting campaigns. 
11 National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003. 
12 Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].   11
Sources of dynamic behaviour 
 
Cagan (1956) argues that there is a need to account for lags to explain the impact of 
the rate of change in prices on the demand for real money balances. First, there is a 
lag between the expected and the actual change in prices. Second, adjustment of 
desired real money balances is not instantaneous.  
Cagan finds that the lag in inflation expectations appears to be unusually long. 
At the same time he assumes that a lag in their impact on real cash balances is 
negligible. However, their separate impact could not be distinguished, implying that 
the greater length of the lag in expectations can be explained by the effect of the lag in 
real balance adjustment. He also finds that both an equation accounting for the lag in 
inflation expectations and an equation capturing the dynamics in real cash balances 
are identical, and thus imply the same relation between prices and money. Cagan also 
incorporated both lags together in the model, arguing that an equation with both lags 
would probably fit the data better. However, he did not estimate this equation, finding 
it difficult because the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable m 1 − t - p 1 − t  in the 
regression could make the estimates inconsistent due to serial correlation. So, in his 
money demand function, relating actual real money balances to an exponentially 
weighted average of past rates of price change, he assumes that actual and desired real 
money balances are equal, and that variations in the expected rate of change in prices 
account for variations in real cash balances. 
  In the present work, to capture both dynamic processes, we estimate the 
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where   
 
M- nominal monetary base (MB) 









⎛ - natural logarithm of real money balances at time t 
e π - is the expected inflation at time t.  
 Coefficient  i αβ  shows the short-run relationship effect of the explanatory 
variables on the dependant one, while the coefficients  i β interpret long-run 
relationships. Theoretically, the coefficients will take the following signs:  2 β >0, 
3 β <0,  4 β >0.  
  Equation (17) is an adaptive expectations model of inflation
13.   
   
Deriving the revenue-maximising money growth rate and maximum seigniorage 
with application to our money demand model 
 
Assuming steady-state conditions, converting this money demand function from logs 
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  The procedure for obtaining the maximum seigniorage is the same as 
described in Section 1.  
  Assuming the steady-state conditions in the long run, the full adjustment of 
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  and the money demand function will be: 
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g S = =    13
  Under steady-state conditions the expected inflation rate is equal to the actual 
inflation rate, and equal to the rate of money growth. That is:  t t
e g = =π π . 
To calculate the revenue-maximising money growth rate we have: 
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  The derived revenue-maximising rate of growth is consistent with Cagan’s. 
The next section presents the empirical results for Belarus.     
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
Testing for a unit root in series  
 
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test show that for the natural 
logarithm of GDP seasonally adjusted (LNYSA) and for the rate of inflation (DP) it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 % and 5 % levels of 
significance respectively. It suggests that these variables are stationary in levels or in 
other words they are integrated of order I(0). The natural logarithm of money balances 
series (LNM) turns out to be stationary in first differences and therefore is integrated 
of order I(1).  
Diagnostic tests performed to see whether the residuals are white noise, are 
satisfactory, except for the test for normality in the inflation series. A serious problem 
of normality in the series suggests a structural change in the data. Therefore, the 
above conclusion of the absence of a unit root can be biased. In this case a test for a 
unit root in the presence of a structural change should be applied to the series. 
Moreover, although the results of the test for normality of LNM series with estimation 
of the ADF regression both in levels and in first differences show that the residuals 
are normally distributed, a graphic examination of the data points to a structural break   14
around August 1998. According to the results of the ADF test of LNM series in first 
differences, one should note that the ADF regression exhibits a random walk. 
However, a graphic examination of the data shows that LNM is trended. Thus, the 
earlier conclusion that LNM is I(1), might be premature. This offers an impetus along 
with DP series to also test the LNM series for a unit root allowing for a structural 
change. 
Examining the inflation rate series graphically, we can observe two sharp 
changes in their level, occurring in December 1996 and September 1998. A sharp 
surge in inflation in September 1998 can be explained by the impact of the financial 
crisis in Russia in August 1998. The earlier inflationary surge is more difficult to 
explain, but is likely linked to accelerated monetary emission, and to a relatively 
significant devaluation of the Belarusian rouble (evaluated at market exchange rates) 
at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997.  
While allowing for structural breaks in series Zivot and Andrews’(1992) 
methodology
14 with unknown timing of the break is employed here.
15  
The results of the Zivot-Andrews test suggest a clear break in intercept/or 
intercept and trend occurring in September 1998. The minimum t statistics are equal 
to –4.91 (break in intercept) and –6.69 (break in both intercept and trend) that allow 
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the inflation rate series at the 5 and 1 % 
levels respectively. Thus, one can conclude that the inflation series is I(0) stationary 
with at least one clear break in the inflation series, occurring around the date of the 
financial crisis in Russia (August-September 1998).  
The results of the Zivot-Andrews test performed for the real cash balances 
series suggest it to be I(0) if we allow for a structural change in the data in intercept 
and in both intercept and trend in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia 
                                                 
14 Zivot-Andrews’ test was performed utilising WinRATS-32 version 5.04. The Zivot-Andrews 
procedure of testing for a unit root in the presence of a structural change allows estimating the 
breakpoint rather than treating it as fixed. It involves estimating the same three regressions, namely, 
allowing for a change in the level of the series, in the trend and in both the level and trend. For more 
descriptions of the test and for critical values see Zivot and Andrews (1992, pp. 251-286). 
15 Perron’s (1989) procedure of testing for unit root allowing for a structural break in series can also be 
applied here. However, the results of Perron’s test can be potentially biased because of the assumption 
of the date of break to be known a priori. As far as the Belarusian data are concerned the break might 
have occurred not in August 1998 but in September or October 1998, if there was a lag in response to 
the crisis in Russia. In this case there is need to use a more sophisticated test for the presence of a unit 
root allowing for a structural break of unknown timing, or in other words assuming that the date of the 
break is unknown a priori.   15
(October 1998).
16 This implies that the money demand series is trend-stationary with 
a shift in mean. Thus, further analysis will be undertaken accounting for this break.  
 
Estimating the final regression: PAM under hypothesis of adaptive expectations 
formation 
 
To capture both dynamic processes: the lag in inflation expectations and a gradual 
adjustment of the actual to desired real money balances we use a Partial Adjustment 
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  where DU is an impulse dummy variable capturing the impact of the Russian 
financial crisis. DU =1 for August 1998 – October 1998 and 0 otherwise.  
  The iterative linearisation method is used here to estimate equation (23). 
Basically, it involves linearisation of a non-linear equation around some initial set of 
parameters. Then, OLS is performed on this linear equation, and a new set of 
parameters is generated. Non-linear equations are linearised around this new set of 
parameters. The process is repeated until convergence is achieved. Table 2 presents 
the summary of the most parsimonious results. 
      




























103.10 95.64  .88750 
 
Table 2: Summary of the results of estimating non-linear regression (23) by the 
iterative linearisation method
17 
                                                 
16 The minimum t-statistics estimated at –5.56 (allowing for a break in intercept) and –5.16 (allowing 
for a break in both intercept and trend) allow rejecting the H0 of a unit root at the 1 and 10 % levels 
respectively.    16
 
The specified model does not pass the conventional test for serial correlation. To 
overcome this problem requires using the Newey-West procedure to adjust estimates 
for serial correlation. Table 3 presents the results of non-linear estimation based on 
Newey-West adjusted S.E.'s Bartlett weights. 
 
1 α   2 α   4 α   5 α  
-.0087 
(.972E-3)   
__________         
P-value 
 [.000] 
.96244       
(.23381)  
__________             
P-value 
[.000] 





.89543   
(.03825)   
___________           
P-value 
[.000] 
Table 3: Summary of the results of estimating model (23) with the estimates adjusted 
for autocorrelation using Newey-West adjusted S.E.'s Bartlett weights  
 
All the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. One can 
notice that the coefficient of inflation expectations is close to one. In this regard it is 
also reasonable to test a hypothesis of rational expectations formation for the 
robustness of the results.  
 
Estimating the final regression: PAM under hypothesis of rational expectations 
formation 
 
When hypothesising rational expectations, we assume that on average the rational 
expected rate of inflation is equal to the actual rate. The interpretation of the 
conditional expected function, is that the forecast error has a zero mean and is 
uncorrelated with all the components of the information set (see Patterson 2000, p. 
533). Therefore, defining  − t 1 t
e π = E t{ t π | 1 − Ωt } as the expectation of inflation 
formed at t-1 to prevail at t, where 1 − Ωt  is the information available at the moment of 
expectation formation, it follows (see Patterson 2000, p.534): 
                                                                                                                                            
17  Model estimated:  0 α + 1 α ( 2 α t π + 2 α (1- 2 α ) 1 − t π + 2 α (1- 2 α )
2
2 − t π +…+ 2 α (1- 2 α )
n
n t− π ) 
+ 3 α DU+ 4 α LNY+ 5 α LNM(-1)  (25). Initially regression (25) was estimated with the presence of a 
linear trend. Due it its statistical insignificance, it was omitted from the regression later on. Coefficients 
1 α ,  4 α  and  5 α are correspondingly equal to 2 λβ ,  4 λβ ,  3 λβ  and  ) 1 ( λ − of regression (23). 
Diagnostics: serial correlation:
2 χ (12)= 26.87[.008]; functional form: 
2 χ (1)= .1175[.732]; normality: 
2 χ (1)= 3.0240[.22]; heteroscedasticity: 
2 χ (1)= .4092[.522].   17
t π = E t{ t π | 1 − Ωt }+e t=  − t 1 t
e π +e t  and                    (26)  
− t 1 t
e π = t π - e t                         (27)  





















3 2 1 ln ) 1 ( ln ,                         (28) 
where is  t µ =  t u λ - t e 2 λβ  
This equation has potential measurement errors, that could render the inflation 
estimator inconsistent, because  t π is correlated with a deterministic term and it is 
determined endogenously. To overcome this problem requires the Generalised 
Instrumental Variable Method, or in other words the Two-Stage Least Squares 
Method (TSLS) that requires  t π  to be regressed on a set of instruments that are 
closely correlated with the expected rate of inflation, but uncorrelated with an error 
term,  t µ . Since it is unrealistic to have all the variables that compose  1 − Ωt , known a 
priori, it is reasonable to adopt a ‘partly rational expectations’ concept. This means 
that we can use just the lagged values of the inflation rate as the information set.  
Moreover, since the use of TSLS method requires the number of instruments to be at 
least equal to the number of regressors, any other right-hand side predetermined 
(exogenous) variables can be used as instruments as well. Thus, we estimate equation 
(28) by using TSLS technique, where intercept, dummy variable (DU), real income 
(LNY), once lagged value of the real cash balances (LNM 1 − t ), and twice lagged 
values of the inflation rate are used as instrumental variables ( 2 1, − − t t π π ).  The results 
of the estimated regression are presented in table 4.  
   
1 α   2 α   3 α   4 α   5 α   GR-Bar-
Sq. 
Sargan's  
2 χ (1) statistic  


































Table 4: Summary of the results of estimating PAM (28) under hypothesis of RE 
formation 
   18
All the coefficients have the expected signs, including the dummy variable, although 
it is still statistically insignificant. Sargan’s 
2 χ statistic shows that the model is 
correctly specified and the instrumental variables are valid instruments. There is still a 
problem of the presence of serial correlation in the residuals that bias the results. The 
Newey-West procedure should be used to adjust estimates for serial correlation (see 
table 5 for the adjusted results). 
     
 
1 α   2 α   3 α   5 α  





















Table 5: Summary of the results of estimating model (28) with a dummy variable 
omitted from the regression and with the estimates adjusted for autocorrelation using 
Newey-West adjusted S.E.'s Bartlett weights  
 
Re-estimation of equation (28) without a dummy variable, after adjusting for 
autocorrelation, improves the estimates, but the real income variable still appears to 
be statistically insignificant. This suggests that in Belarus in 1995-2002 money 
demand was still mainly determined by the expected inflation rate. Indeed, because of 
the policy of excessive money emission over most of the analysed period, this fact is 
not surprising. Moreover it is necessary to note that the adjustment in real cash 
balances is not instantaneous. The coefficient of adjustment is equal to 0.11596 (1-
0.88404) suggesting that nearly 12 per cent of the discrepancy between actual and real 
cash balances is eliminated within one month, and the full adjustment is achieved 
within less than 9 months. The long-run semi-elasticity coefficient of money demand 
with respect to the inflation rate is equal to -0.0782 meaning that on the average real 
cash balances decreased by 7.8 per cent a month when the inflation rate increased by 
one per cent.  
Calculation of the revenue-maximising money growth rate will proceed on the 
basis of the estimates obtained from the PAM under the hypothesis of rational 
expectations.  
   19
Deriving the revenue-maximising money growth rate on the basis of the obtained 
estimates from PAM under the hypothesis of rational expectations 
 
The revenue-maximising rate of money growth for Belarus from May 1995 – 
December 2002, derived from (22), was on average equal to 12.79 per cent per month, 
or 43.5 per cent per quarter, or 323.88 per cent per year.
18  
To analyse the productivity of seigniorage over 1995-2002, we calculate the 
maximum revenue that can be obtained if the steady-state conditions hold, and 
compare this with actual revenue. (see table 6).  
From table 6, first of all the maximum seigniorage rate averaged between 7-10 
per cent during 1995-2002.  That is in line with the results obtained by Cagan (1956) 
and by Romer (1996). Their findings also suggest that the revenue-maximising money 
growth rate varies about 300 per cent per annum. This also supports our findings. 
Table 6 shows that throughout the period the actual rate of seigniorage does not 
exceed the steady-state one, although it is high enough to cover the budget deficit 
(averaged 1.6 per cent of GDP in 1995-2001), and even partly cover quasi-fiscal 
operations accounting for 5-6 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000.  
Second, in 1995 the actual rate of money growth exceeded the revenue-maximising 
rate and a higher level of seigniorage was achieved at the expense of accelerating 
inflation (calculated as a period average). In this period the actual rate of inflation 
exceeded the revenue-maximising rate (it is equal to the revenue-maximising money 
growth rate under the steady-state conditions) by 75 per cent. Despite the fact that in 
1998, 1999 and 2000 the actual inflation rate exceeded the nominal money growth 
rate, both of these indicators remained lower than the revenue-maximising money 
growth rate. This can be explained by the fact that the estimated revenue-maximising 
money growth rate is itself high. It, however, should not be referred to as a yardstick 
for achieving maximum seigniorage because the costs of that will be high in the form 
of accelerating inflation. Given a mechanism of administrative price controls in 
Belarus we assume that the difference between the true and official rates of inflation 
is significant. A measure of a true rate of inflation should have raised a coefficient of 
the inflation rate, and therefore have reduced the value of revenue-maximizing money 
                                                 
18 Taking into account that the monthly growth rate is equal to 12.79 per cent and the steady-state 
conditions held, the quarterly and the yearly revenue-maximising growth rate are calculated 
correspondingly as ((1.1279)^3 – 1)*100 and ((1.1279)^12 – 1)*100.  
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growth rate and respectively the values of seigniorage and IT. The fact that in 1995, 
the year of partial price liberalisation, the rate of actual money growth was in excess 
of the revenue-maximising one, and period-average inflation exceeded the period-
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Table 6: Maximum annual revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax and actual 
revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax compared
19 
  
In summary, the policy of money-led stimulation of the economy triggered an 
inflationary spiral consequently leading to demonetisation and unofficial dollarisation 
of the economy. According to our results a one per cent increase in the monthly 
inflation rate in Belarus during 1995-2002 on average led to a 7.8 per cent decrease in 
                                                 
19 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 
2003]. * Since the data on the total monetary base (inclusive both currency in circulation and bank 
reserves) are not available for 1994, here the data on currency in circulation are only taken to evaluate 
the actual monetary growth rate in 1995.  **For 1995 the figures on the actual revenue from 
seigniorage and from inflation tax (period average) as a per cent of GDP are missing because of the 
lack of the data needed to compute them.      21
real money balances per month. Thus on average in 1996-2002 only 70 per cent of the 
economy was monetised.  
This policy of monetary emission pursued by the Belarusian government 
during 1995-2002 aimed to support state-owned enterprises and in doing so, to avoid 
a sharp output contraction that occurred in many transition economies after the 
introduction of stabilisation packages. This was undertaken at the expense of the 
private sector and those households who were not the recipients of subsidies. In this 
sense such a policy could not be regarded as equitable or efficient. The fact that by 
2002 a decrease in money supply could be observed due to restrictions on the policy 
of monetary emission, with a consequent fall in the inflation rate, and the stabilisation 
of the Belarusian Rouble, can serve as evidence of the Belarusian authorities finally 
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